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POINT ONE: THE COURT SHOULD DENY 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
'rhe issue of Statute of Frauds has been thoroughly 
reviewed by this Court, and extensively dealt with in 
hrirfs previously filed by both Appellant and Respond-
Pnt. 
Appellant devoted nearly one-half of its main brief 
to this issue, and saw fit to devote an additional 19 
pages of its reply brief to the same question. This 
\\'as in derogation of Rule 75 (P) (2), U.R.C.P., that 
a reply b6ef shall be limited to new matter set forth in 
respondent's brief. Despite this, Appellant now seeks 
t1J again argue the same question, which has been ex-
haustively revi,ewed by this Court and set at rest in a 
unanimous opinion. Further, Appellant has now filed 
a 'Supplemental' brief, bringing to 4 the Appellant's 
briefo now on file in this case. 
'l'he reference to the parties considering this point 
a~ 'peripheral' is hardly accurate. Respondent raised 
thr speeific issues in its Answer (R-10), pre-trial order 
( R-3o) requested instructions ( R-71), exceptions to the 
trial court's refusal to so instruct (T-246), Statement 
of Respondent's Points on Appeal (R-122), Brief of 
Respon~en_t, page 38. _The issue ·was revie,ved hy Ap 
pellant m its Reply Bnef at page 57. 
The law is clear that the issue of the Statute of 
Frauds, like other questions, should be submitteJ !u 
jury under proper instructions. 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statutt 1 
of, Sec. 29.L: 
"Instructions in actions involving the statute of 
frauds should clearly and correctly state the a]J· 
plicable law and be in conformity with the plead- : 
ings, issues, and evidence." 
The main authority Appellant relies on, Verdi u. 
II el1wr State Bank, (1921), 57 U. 502, 196 P. 225, is 
clearly not in point. '11here the question involved a 
certificate of deposit, a written negotiable instrume11I. : 
It needs no citation of authority to agree that writteli 
instruments are interpreted by the Court, not reviewed 
as an issue of fact. 
'11he cases cited by this Court in its opinion are 
controlling of the question. San Francisco Brewing 
Corvoration 1.:s. Bowman, 343 P 21, (1959), involved 
1 
an oral contract with the identical section of the Statute 
being invoked by defendant. The California Courl 
held it was error to refuse to submit the issue to the 
. . 
Jury, saymg: 
"Upon this record, the first sentence was a cor-
rect statement of the law, and if, on any view of 
the evidence, the statute was applicable, plain 
tiff was entitled to have the jury so instructeil." 
Sugar vs. lJ1 ill er, 1957, 6 U 2d 433, 315 p2 862, ii 
also in point. lt holds that the question of the Statute 
2 
11 f ]1'nrnds should be submitted to the jury under the 
j:l'O[Wl' instructions when an oral contract of guarantee 
\1a~ involved. 
Kimmel 1;s Foster Freight Lines, Inc., 1954, 267 
s.W. :2r1 ;:,3;1, is also of interest. In that case the identi-
eal statute was plead by defendant against plaintiff's 
('!aim of an oral contract of employment. The court 
l11·ld the iRRUe should be submitted to the jury for de-
termination. 
Additional cases holding the duration of oral con-
trneb to be a jury question, and requiring submission 
ur tlw issue to the jury under proper instructions, are 
Ji'. P. Brown & Sons vs. Rattray, Ala., 1939, 192 So. 851, 
fllr111ton <1u. cs. Stewart, Ark. 1930, 33 S. vV. 2d 50, and 
Scolto11 rs. TV right and Sanders, Texas, 1926, 280 S.W. 
908. 
This Court's decision has no reference to a "ma-
jority" or "minority" rule, as appellant insists. The 
entirP question of the agreement, its terms and existence, 
Y:a~ in dispute. The special interrogatory did not, nor 
\1as it intended to do other than resolve the question of 
tlie existence of an alleged agreement to loan. The 
rl1mdio11 issue was never presented to the jury and could 
not ]Jossihly lmve been considered by it in answering 
''yp:-;" or "no" to the special interrogatory submitted by 
tile eourt. 
Appellant's most recent brief states: 
''The question imt to this Court on appeal is 
whether or not the trial court erred in making 
a determination that the agreement violated the 
3 
Statute of Frauds. This question has not been 
answered by this Court." 
This assertion is patently wrong; this court did : 
answer the question in the affirmative, holding the 
question of the Statute of Frauds to be one for the jury 1 
"based on whatever facts might relate to the wording 
of the agreement and its interpretation." 
These facts include the length of time of perform- · 
ance of the Steenberg prime contract and the M & S : 
subcontract, testimony of witnesses and all other salient 
evidence bearing on the question of the length of time • 
the loan agreement required for performance. Respond- : 
ent does not claim that pertinent evidence was refused 
on this issue; it is our claim (1) the interrogatory does 1 
not as a matter of law provide the answer to the issue 
of the statute, and (2) the jury, in the absence of in-
structions and argument, could not and did not make ' 
any meaningful determination of fact with regard to : 
the length of time required for performance of the 
loan agreement. 
We respectfully submit Respondent is entitled to 
a determination of this issue by a finder of fact, and 
the opinion of this court was not in error. 
All of the matters in Appellant's Brief and Petition 
have been previously briefed and argued to this court. 
The petition for rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully, 
OLMSTEAD, STINE & CAMPBELL 1 
Attorneys for Respondents 
4 
